Little research explores the activity of sharing mobile numbers on OSNs, in particular via public posts. In this work, we understand the characteristics and risks of mobile numbers shared on OSNs either via profile or public posts and focus on Indian mobile numbers. We collected 76,347 unique mobile numbers posted by 85,905 users on Twitter and Facebook and analyzed 2,997 numbers, prefixed with +91. We observed that most users shared their own mobile numbers to spread urgent information and to market products, IT facilities and escort business. Users resorted to applications like Twitterfeed and TweetDeck to post and popularize mobile numbers on multiple OSNs. To assess risks associated with mobile numbers exposed on OSNs, we used mobile numbers to gain sensitive information (e.g. name, Voter ID) about their owners. We communicated the observed risks to the owners by calling them on their mobile number. Few users were surprised to know the online presence of their number, while few users intentionally put it online for business purposes. With these observations, we highlight that there is a need to monitor leakage of mobile numbers via profile and public posts. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first exploratory study to critically investigate the exposure of mobile numbers on OSNs.
INTRODUCTION
Today, Online Social Networks (OSNs) have facilitated their users with variety of services. Users can easily connect to new people and re-connect to old friends, receive Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. COSN'13, October 07-08, 2013, Boston, MA, USA. Copyright 2013 ACM 978-1-4503-2084-9/13/10$15.00. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2512938.2512959. live feeds of their friends' activity, and share multimedia content with friends in controlled and restrictive ways. These services have attracted users to generate voluminous new content on OSNs, for instance, 46% of adult Internet users post original photos or videos online that they themselves have created. 1 User Generated Content (UGC) on online social networks is observed to have high similarities with offline interactions of users [11] . Therefore, concerns have been raised on (un)intentional mention of one's sensitive information such as age, sexual orientation, credit card details, health records, on online profile or posts [4, 8, 12] .
Phone (Mobile) number is an example of identifiable information with which a real-world individual can be associated uniquely, in most cases [14] . The associated individual can become an easy target for SMS and phone-based phishing scams, 2 which may lead to annoyance, disturbance, and stalking. Such attacks can be made impactful with easy access to large number of mobile numbers shared publicly on OSNs. Mobile numbers can be shared either via profile attributes [2] or via posts (see Figure 1 ). Auxiliary details of mobile number owners shared along with the mobile numbers, or collected otherwise, can help attackers to launch targeted attacks against them. To examine the necessity of safeguard methods to prevent public exposure of users' mobile numbers either via profile or posts, there is a need to comprehend mobile number sharing behavior on OSNs, and the gravity of associated risks. India has been a popular venue for mobile and phone frauds, owing to huge telecom industry. India has the second largest mobile network in the world, with 919.17 million subscribers by Feb '13. 3 We, therefore, focus on exposure of Indian mobile numbers in this work. We explore reasons, modes and whereabouts of Indian mobile numbers shared on two most popular OSNs -Facebook and Twitter. An Indian mobile number can be used to reveal critical information about its owner such as name, age, location, which may invite targeted identity attacks. We communicate the risks of sharing mobile numbers online to their owners by calling them on their numbers and note their reactions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related work on privacy leaks on OSNs. Section 3 enumerates contributions of the paper, Section 4 describes the methodology to collect mobile numbers shared on OSNs. Section 5 elaborates the analysis of leaked mobile number on OSNs. Section 6 discusses if mobile numbers can be exploited to disclose sensitive information of their owners. Section 7 presents summary of the paper, a discussion on the applicability of the results, and some limitations of our work.
RELATED WORK
On an OSN, a user is defined by a set of attributes e.g. name, age, education, and network. In this paper, we refer an attribute as Personally Identifiable Information (PII) if the attribute itself or in combination of other attributes can connect an online user account with a real world entity. Researchers have widely studied leakage of PII and sensitive attributes on OSNs e.g. email address [1] , age [4] , and phone numbers [7] . Magno et al. in their work on characterization of Google+, observed many Indian single males shared mobile numbers as their profile attribute. In our work, we attempt to understand the other characteristics of exposed Indian mobile numbers on OSNs. Potential risks associated with aggregation of PII and sensitive attributes from multiple social networks, have been explored in literature [2] . Krishnamurthy pointed in his work that auxiliary information collected from online sources could help in connecting an online profile uniquely to an offline entity [5] . In this work, we intend to explore the viability of the opinion. We exploit Indian mobile numbers and attempt to understand if mobile numbers can be used to gather other profile characteristics of their owners. Further, Krishnamurthy suggested that data augmentation privacy leaks could be prevented via alerting users about dispersive information sharing vulnerabilities. We follow the suggestion and attempt to communicate risks of online sharing of mobile numbers to their owners. In this work, we communicate the risks by calling a sample of users (2,492) whose mobile numbers are available on OSNs, via an Interactive Voice Response (IVR) System.
CONTRIBUTIONS
In the process of understanding the nature of mobile number sharing on OSNs and its associated risks, we found that -1) Emergency, Marketing, Entertainment and Escort business were major contexts observed on Twitter while marketing IT facilities context was observed on Facebook, where mobile numbers were shared. 2) Most owners themselves shared their mobile numbers on OSNs; and users of metropolitan cities in India actively posted mobile numbers on OSNs than other locations in India. 3) Users posted mobile numbers on multiple OSNs simultaneously, evident by the use of third party applications. 4) A publically shared mobile number can be exploited to retrieve sensitive details of their owners such as number, age, voter ID, family details, and complete address from multiple data sources. We communicated the risks of online sharing of mobile numbers to their owners. We found that few users were unaware of the online presence of their number, while, few were aware and told us that they posted the number intentionally for business purposes.
METHODOLOGY
We deployed a three stage data collection methodologykeyword selection, data collection and data validation (see Figure 2 ). We collected Indian mobile numbers shared on two popular OSNs -Facebook and Twitter.
Keyword selection
A pre-requisite to collect public posts and tweets with a mobile number, was to select a set of relevant keywords [8] .
To create the keyword list, we surveyed some OSN users in IIIT-Delhi to determine possible words they would use while sharing a mobile number on OSNs. We selected most commonly listed words for our initial set of 50 keywords, such as mobile number, contact us, call me. With the initial set of keywords, we collected 1,525 public tweets using Twitter Streaming API 4 and 1,000 public posts using Facebook Graph API. 5 We used the collected posts to identify other common keywords when mobile numbers were shared (adapting a standard technique of query expansion from Information Retrieval [13] ). We tokenized the posts, removed stop words and added most frequent words to expand the seed keyword set size to 278.
Data collection
We used the final set of keywords to collect public English posts and bio 6 which shared mobile numbers, using Twitter Streaming API and Facebook Graph API. We started our data collection from Facebook on November 16, 2012 and ended on April 20, 2013, while from Twitter on October 12, 2012 and ended on April 20, 2013. We stored public bio and posts which shared mobile numbers on OSNs, along with profiles of the users who shared the number.
To tag Indian mobile numbers in users' posts and users' bio, we exploited the standard convention and structure of an Indian mobile number. It is a 10 digit number, where first digit should start with either 9 or 8 or 7. It can be prefixed with a country code (+91) or trunk code (0). 7 We used rule-based named entity recognition [9] and created a set of regular expression rules which captured Indian mobile number structure. We further observed that most users post Indian mobile numbers in different patterns. Some of the sample patterns are, numbers with no space/dash in mobile number (0999xxxxxxx), one dash after country code (+91-9xxxxx4979), three dashes (+91-9x7-1xx-02xx), and dots between digits (757.3x.52xxx). We modified our regular expressions to capture all possible ways of posting an Indian mobile number on social networks. We categorized Indian numbers prefixed with +91 as "Category +91" numbers (+91-9x7-1xx-02xx), prefixed with 0 as "Category 0" (09x71xx02xx), and prefixed with nothing "Category void" (9x7-1xx-02xx). Table 1 shows the count of mobile numbers collected from tweets or bio on Twitter and public posts or names on Facebook.
Data validation
Rule-based named entity recognition used to extract Indian mobile numbers from public posts and bio in the earlier stage, relied on a set of regular expressions and therefore misinterpreted certain other country numbers as Indian mobile numbers. Mobile number format for few countries (United Kingdom, 8 and USA 9 ) is similar to that of an Indian mobile number. Mobile numbers from UK are also 10-digit numbers starting with 07, which were confused as Indian mobile numbers prefixed with 0 and starting with 7.
Mobile numbers from USA also follow 10-digit format with first three digits representing area code, ranging from 2-9, therefore USA mobile numbers without country code and with area codes starting with 7, 8, 9 are similar to an Indian mobile number. To avoid any noise in our database, we ran a validation check for the Category 0 and Category void numbers. Category +91 numbers were confirmed to belong to India as they were prefixed with Indian country code. We used a service 10 which checked if a number's first four digits belonged to a valid Indian mobile number series, however the service was not updated. We observed that 19,934 mobile numbers out of 23,405 in Category 0 (85%), and 42,360 numbers out of 49,946 in Category void (85%), were confirmed to be Indian numbers by the service. After manual verification, we observed some non-Indian numbers were marked as Indian numbers by the service. We therefore, considered only Category +91 mobile numbers for our analysis, which were confirmed to be Indian mobile numbers. Our intent was to avoid any bias or noisy inferences by including Category 0 and Category void numbers.
ANALYSIS 5.1 Context analysis
To understand the context, we extracted most frequent words from the bio and posts which shared the number. We removed stop words and performed stemming to avoid repeated forms of the same root word. We manually analyzed word-clouds of the most frequent words (see Figure 3 (a) and 3(b)). We observe words such as blood, specialist, hospital, love, sexy, escort, girl, music, movie, fun, offer, reservation, ticket, hotel, seo, sale, astrologer, business in Figure 3 (a).
We infer that on Twitter, users post Indian mobile numbers, majorly to ask for blood donations / aid, help in emergency situations, to promote escort business, to promote entertainment, to market for travel, holiday, hotel packages, and to buy / sell products, etc. Such a behavior is understandable since Twitter is used as a news media, and marketing platform [6] . On Facebook, users post Indian mobile numbers majorly in context of Information Technology (IT) facilities and education related products, evident by the presence of words such as price, hp, battery, dell, laptop, ibm, email, notebook, computer (see Figure 3 (b)). We infer that users post mobile numbers on social media platforms in order to benefit from social network structure and promote their business by spreading the contact information (mobile number) to large number of users.
Ownership analysis
Exposure of mobile numbers by non-owners might lead to unwanted privacy leaks and annoyance to their owners. 11 We therefore analyze if owners of the mobile numbers themselves leaked their numbers at the first place or other users posted them. For each mobile number collected from Twitter (885) and Facebook (2, 191) , we retrieved the first tweet (post) in our dataset sharing that mobile number on Twitter (or Facebook). The mobile number was marked as 'leaked by its owner', if the tweet (post) included a first person pronoun such as me, my, us, mera (my in English) along with most frequent action verbs such as call, text, sms, ping, whatsapp, message, contact. For instance we check for the presence of phrases like -"call us", "text us". The mobile number was marked as 'leaked by a non-owner', if the tweet (post) included second person pronoun such as you, your, yours or third person pronoun such as his, her, them along with same action verbs used with first person pronouns. Researchers used only pronouns to check for ownership [8] , this may give false positives like -"You may call me at xxx", however we avoid it by using phrases here. We also assume that mobile numbers shared on Twitter via bio or on Facebook via name are users' own mobile numbers. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of mobile numbers which were leaked by their owners and non-owners. Two hundred and ninety one mobile numbers (32.8%) were shared by their owners while only 18 mobile numbers (2.0%) were shared by non-owners on Twitter. Four hundred and eighty five mobile numbers (22%) were shared by owners, and 25 mobile numbers (1.1%) were shared by non-owners on Facebook. Example post where owner shared his mobile number is "F1 INR 2500/-tickets are available with me..!! Limited stocks..!! Ping me or call me up on +91 989 xxx xxxx asap! " Example post where non-owner shared the mobile number is "@VodafoneIN My friend Debasrita took a new connection (+91-73816xxxxx), she is having issues. Please contact her at +91-9556xxxxxx". For remaining mobile numbers, the methodology used could not infer if the numbers were shared by the owners or non-owners. Example post is "Need a male punjabi artist of age 35 for a ad in #chennai pls contact +91 98-41-xxxxxx ". 
Social Network Mechanism Mobile numbers

Topographical distribution
We probe into the location of the users, who shared Indian mobile numbers on OSNs, to understand if users of few locations more actively posted mobile numbers on social networks than others. We analyzed geo-tagged posts which shared mobile numbers on both social networks. We identified only 13 geo-tagged tweets on Twitter, where 9 unique users shared 12 mobile numbers. Top states from where the numbers were posted are Delhi, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. We did not find any geo-tags in Facebook public posts which shared the number.
With few geo-tagged tweets, we investigated whether location of the users who shared mobile numbers can be estimated either via their 'location' attribute or bio description on Twitter [10] . We used Yahoo Maps 12 to trace a location present in users' location attribute or bio attribute, to a city, state and country. We found location of 777 users via 'location' attribute and of 747 users via their bio description. We ignored locations which did not map to real geographical locations like "Justin beiber's heart". Table 3 shows the country and state from where most Indian mobile numbers were shared, either via 'location' or 'bio' attribute. We infer that mobile numbers were largely shared by users of urban cities in India. Further, most numbers belonged to Indian metropolitan telecom circles and large cities "A" circles 13 (see Table 4 ). Note all 5 "A" circles appear in top 10 list. 
Location of user
Source analysis
We inquire the source or application by which most mobile numbers were posted on OSNs. To extract application used to post the number, we extracted 'source' attribute of the tweet, available from Twitter API, and 'application' attribute of the post, available from Facebook Graph API. On Twitter, apart from the web (234), mobile numbers were largely posted from social aggregators and other social networks such as Facebook (148), Twitterfeed (121), Google (121), LinkedIn (50), TweetDeck (22). We observe major use of social aggregators and other social networks to post mobile numbers on Twitter. Users might be sharing same mobile number not only on one OSN but on multiple OSNs simultaneously. On Facebook, most numbers were posted by Facebook mobile applications such as Facebook mobile (125), Facebook for iPhone (36 numbers), Photos (34), Facebook for Android (19), and few by social aggregators such as HootSuite (31), and Twitterfeed (3). We observe major use of social network's mobile platform to post numbers on multiple OSNs while comparatively less use of social aggregators. This could help the developers to understand other OSNs on which same mobile number was shared.
12 http://developer.yahoo.com/maps/ 13 http://host.comsoc.org/sistersocieties/india iete/circles.pdf
RISK ANALYSIS 6.1 Risks of Collation
We now turn our focus to understand how publicly shared mobile numbers can be exploited to gather critical and sensitive information about the owners. We used two online services -Truecaller 14 and OCEAN. 15 Truecaller allows to query a mobile number and returns the name of the owner as well as the network operator. OCEAN allows to query a name of a person and returns matching entries from publicly available e-government data sources, listing Voter ID, family details, age, home address, and father's name. OCEAN has data only for Delhi citizens.
We got manual annotators to extract data from Truecaller and OCEAN for Category +91 mobile numbers. For each number, they were asked to observe name of the owner, her location, and mobile number operator from Truecaller, 16 along with the name of the owner, and her location from public posts and profiles on OSNs, sharing the same number. Possible names of the mobile number owner and her possible locations were inferred for 2,997 Category +91 numbers. Name of the owners whose inferred location was Delhi, were then used to query OCEAN and matching set of Delhi citizens were recorded. Surprisingly, out of annotated 94 Delhi mobile numbers, we were able to uniquely identify 8 Delhi users with details like name, age, father's name, home location, gender, and voter ID (see Table 5 ). Aggregation of information extracted from OSNs with the otherwise collected information about a Delhi mobile number owner, may lead to identity theft.
Details Shared by owner? 9873xxxxxx, X Kakrania, 24, Male, X Kakrania, "B-***, B-block, X Vihar Ph-I, Delhi", WHC17xxx63
Yes +9199xxxx2708, X Gambhir, 23, Male, X X Gambhir, "***, xxxx Bagh, Delhi", NLNxxx5696
No Table 5 : Anonymized mobile number, name, age, gender, father's name, address, Voter ID of Delhi residents who shared their mobile number on OSNs.
We also experimented with an Android application, Whatsapp, 17 to understand if we could add leaked mobile numbers and hence abuse the Address Book Matching feature of the application and get access to their status messages [3] . We added leaked mobile numbers to a phone's contact directory and ran Whatsapp application from the phone. Users leaked variety of sensitive information via their Whatsapp status updates such as travel plans, social network profile, BBM Pins. Few examples of status updates are "100% Single"; "No longer in India. UK: # +44 75xx 81xxxx US#610xx xxxxx as of June 10"; "www.facebook.com/iakrfilms"; "New BBM Pin: 25C7xxxx". We infer that an accidental / unintentional leak of mobile number on OSNs is capable of exposing other sensitive information.
Risk Communication
With evident risks associated with leaking mobile numbers online, we attempted to communicate the observed risks 14 to communicate awareness information among users. Online bloggers deployed automated tools to display partially obfuscated mobile numbers onto a public web page 20 and SMS with random texts, to publicly shared mobile numbers. 21 We deployed an IVR system and communicated the risks associated with posting mobile number online by calling the owners of the numbers. We chose IVR to ensure the reach to the owners and to convince the credibility of the message to them. We now discuss the IVR deployment details, calling procedure and users' reactions to the calls.
IVR system design and implementation
We set up an IVR system using FreeSWITCH 22 and a Java application (see Figure 4 ). We called 2,492 mobile numbers from Category +91 collected from earlier mentioned methodology until 28th February '13. In India, we were not required to go through an Institutional Review Board (IRB)-type approval process before calling the users. However, we applied similar practices in this work. Prior to the actual risk communication part of the message, we informed the user that we will record the call for research purposes and log all responses and activities of callee in a database. Furthermore, participants were given options to disconnect the call and request the deletion of the audio recording, at any given point of time during the call. When a callee answered the call, for credibility purposes, we introduced ourselves as researchers from New Delhi. We then played the risk communicating message -"We found your number on X", where X was either "Facebook" or "Twitter" or "Facebook and Twitter", depending on the source from where we extracted the number of the callee. We then prompted a voice message "Posting your number online is not a good practice. Doing so will make you fall prey to various phone number frauds. Keep yourself safe and consider removing your number from the Internet." We then presented callee with the following options: "Press 1, If you did not know that your number can be leaked and now you will remove it from the Internet; Press 2, If you posted it purposefully and you will not remove it from the Internet; Press 3, if you want to hear the message again." If the user pressed either 1 or 2, we requested him to leave us a feedback and later gave him an option to end the call. We made the calls during weekdays from 11:00 IST to 16:00 IST. Figure 5 shows how callees collectively reacted at each stage during the call. Each stage in the call is associated with a probability and the number of users who chose that stage. Sixty one percent of callees who picked the call, opted to listen to the message and six percent chose to remove their mobile numbers from OSNs. An equivalent percentage (6.2%) chose not to remove their numbers. Forty seven users from the 2,492 numbers that we called, left feedback on our IVR system. A few are: "Thank you for information, I have deleted, I will not post my number online", "I want to know how to remove my number and I don't know, I haven't put my number purposely but if it is there, where exactly it is there I would also like to know that. Please get in touch with me asap. Thank you". Some callees showed their concerns and some even requested us for help to remove their numbers from the Internet. Such user reactions urge the necessity for a safeguard solution to control the spread of personal and sensitive information on OSNs. We also received feedback saying "I posted my number purposely for my website promotion, I usually do deal in web hosting business so that is why I want someone to contact me for hosting services" implying intentional sharing of mobile numbers. Figure 5 : Callee Decision Tree.
User Reactions
DISCUSSION
In this work, we examined the exposure of Indian mobile numbers on OSNs via profile and public posts and investigated the associated privacy risks. Most mobile numbers were shared to ask for blood help, to market astrology business, IT facilities, and escort services. We observed few posts where numbers were shared in personal contexts like "My contact no in India is +91-9958xxxxxx", however posts used for personal contexts had few context specific keywords, therefore, personal contexts were difficult to highlight. Users exploited social aggregators to popularize same number on multiple OSNs. Sensitive information such as Voter ID could be extracted with the use of mobile number and other information sources. To communicate the risks and vulnerabilities, we called 2,492 numbers with an IVR setup and received feedback. Few users did not know about the presence of their mobile number on OSNs while few told us that they intentionally put it to publicize their business.
Indian mobile numbers are heavily shared for non-personal contexts (e.g. marketing, emergency), even such a behavior may invite unwanted spammers / calls to marketers themselves. OSNs do not provide safeguard mechanisms to disallow sensitive and identifiable information exposure via either profile or public posts. There is a need to build technological, people and process oriented solutions to forewarn users and raise the awareness towards risks of PII leaks, so that users can make better decisions. We speculate other information on OSNs such as Blackberry Messenger Pins (BBM), and email addresses, can also help in extracting more sensitive information about their owners. 23 We recognize the limitations of our data collection methodology and analysis. During our keyword selection phase, we used a limited set of keywords to extract posts with mobile numbers from OSNs, and refined keyword set only once. We leave the implications of iterative keyword refinement on the quality of the dataset for future work. We expect further studies to understand impact of geographical, cultural differences, and user personality traits on the practice of sharing mobile number.
